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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 
RESOLUTION OF THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND 
COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT CITIZEN SUIT 
DEBATE 
J(rista ctree1t* 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act 
(EPCRA) mandates that companies using and storing certain 
hazardous chemicals file reports with specified local and state 
groups, disclosing the quantity, type, and location of those chemi-
cals. Those groups utilize the reports to draft an emergency plan 
to deal with hazardous chemical releases. EPCRA permits citi-
zens to sue the owners or operators of facilities which fail to file 
the requisite reports. In interpreting the citizen suit provision, 
the courts have struggled with whether to permit suits to con-
tinue if the alleged violator has cured the violation, by filing the 
reports, prior to the commencement of the suit. The United States 
Supreme Court recently resolved a split among the circuit courts 
of appeals on the issue of "historical" violations in EPCRA citizen 
suits, holding that plaintiffs alleging only historical violations un-
der EPCRA lacked standing to sue. This Comment argues that 
the Supreme Court's disposal of the historical violation issue 
through standing doctrine is potentially far-reaching in conse-
quence and therefore misguided. Nonetheless, due to the policies 
underlying EPCRA and its current construction, this Comment 
agrees with the result, if not the rationale, of the Court, and 
asserts that citizens should not be permitted to sue under EP-
CRA if they allege only historical violations. 
* Solicitations and Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW, 1998-1999. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act1 
(EPCRA), like most environmental protection statutes, developed as 
a response to the potential for environmental disaster. In our indus-
trialized world, the use, manufacture, and storage of toxic chemicals 
has become commonplace. Communities surrounding such industrial-
ized areas have always faced the threat of chemical spills. Before 1986, 
those communities were often in the dark about exactly what types 
and quantities of chemicals were in their midst.2 The informational 
void meant communities could not adequately prepare and plan for 
emergency responses in the event of a spill or release. 
On December 3, 1984, the industrialized world realized the danger 
inherent in environmental ignorance.3 Lethal methyl isocyanate gas 
was released from the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India.4 
The spill was to become one of the worst environmental disasters in 
history, causing the deaths of over 6,000 people and injuring 100,000 
more.5 As the public searched for someone to blame, government 
officials quickly realized that the lack of an adequate emergency plan 
contributed to the extent of the disaster.6 When the alarms sounded 
at the Bhopal plant, people actually ran towards the contaminated 
plant to investigate.7 
The need for emergency planning was underscored by a second 
Union Carbide accident. Following the Bhopal incident by only nine 
months, the Union Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia released 
a potentially deadly amount of a dangerous pesticide.s No one was 
seriously injured, but the incident spurred Congress to take steps to 
1 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001-11049 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
2 Bruce Selcraig, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, SIERRA, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 38. Jon 
Holtzman, vice-president for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, explained how companies 
treated citizen inquiries regarding chemical use and storage prior to 1986: ''We stonewalled them 
and didn't give them the time of day." See id. 
S See generally JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL 
3-32 (1993). 
4 See id. at 3-4. The immediate cause of the spill has not been definitively proven. It is 
suspected that the accidental introduction of water into the methyl isocyanate holding tank 
provoked a chemical reaction which caused the leak. Union Carbide maintains that the leak was 
caused by sabotage. See id. at 8-11. 
6 See Selcraig, supra note 2, at 38. 
6 See CASSELS, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
7 See Selcraig, 8Upra note 2, at 38. 
S See id. 
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avoid or mitigate future disasters.9 In 1985, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) commissioned a study on the risks of chemical 
releases, identifying over 6,900 chemical spill accidents in five years 
which were responsible for 135 deaths and over 1,400 injuries.lO The 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act was en-
acted less than a year later, in 1986.11 EPCRA has two purposes: to 
enhance the public's knowledge about dangerous chemicals located in 
the community, and to establish national, state and local emergency 
response plans.12 Section 11046, an important provision of the statute, 
established that EPCRA could be enforced not only by an action 
of the EPA but also by private citizen suits.13 The citizen suit provi-
sion has engendered some controversy, with debates arising over the 
proper scope of section 11046.14 
This Comment examines the citizen suit provision of EPCRA. Sec-
tion I discusses the development ofEPCRA and the current structure 
of the statute. Section II examines case law pertaining to citizen suits 
generally. Section III discusses the various judicial approaches to the 
issue of whether EPCRA citizen suits are permitted to continue once 
the alleged violator has complied with the statute prior to the com-
mencement of the suit. Section IV reviews the Supreme Court's ''re-
solution" of the citizen suit debate on historical violations in Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment. 15 Finally, Section V analyzes the 
effect of the Steel Co. case on suits for historical violations, and argues 
that the text of the statute and the public policies underlying it 
mitigate against permitting citizen suits alleging only historical viola-
tions. 
9 See id. See also 42 u.s.c. §§ 11001-11049 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
10 See Draft EPA Study Counts 6,900 Releases of Acutely 1bxic Chemicals in Five Years, 16 
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1022 (Oct. 11, 1985). 
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11049. 
12 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962 (1986). 
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046. 
14 Compare Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(interpreting § 11046 as permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations) with Atlantic States 
Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
§ 11046 does not permit such suits). 
16 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1008 (1998). For the purpose of 
differentiating the two opinions, this Comment will refer to the Seventh Circuit's opinion as 
Citizens, and to the Supreme Court's reversal of that decision as Steel Co. 
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1. THE HISTORY AND COMPqNENTS OF EPCRA 
By congressional standards, the enactment of EPCRA was ex-
tremely rapid, although it engendered some opposition and debate 
during enactment.16 The Bhopal and West Virginia incidents had 
heightened public awareness about the lack of easily accessible infor-
mation regarding the use, storage, and manufacture of chemicals; 
Congress' response was to pass EPCRA "as a means of filling this 
informational void and improving emergency response capabilities."17 
Originally, the provisions which became EPCRA were part of the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).18 How-
ever, the legislative history indicates that Congress adopted the title 
"Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act" in the 
Conference Report, and that EPCRA was intended to be a free-stand-
ing environmental statute.19 The resulting statute has two primary 
functions. The "right-to-know" component mandates the disclosure of 
the presence and release of certain toxic chemicals to the EPA, with 
the agency, in turn, making this information available to the public.20 
The "emergency planning" component requires the establishment of 
national, state, and local commissions to prepare emergency response 
plans in the event of a chemical release.21 The following subsections 
explore each provision of the statute in greater detail. 
A number of commentators have lauded the success of EPCRA.22 
Some have also noted the secondary effects of the statute in reducing 
pollution and toxic releases; as one article stated, "the public release 
16 See Selcraig, supra note 2, at 43. In fact, a coalition comprised of the chemical industry, a 
key House subcommittee and even several EPA officials sought to defeat the bill. Though killed 
in subcommittee, EPCRA had a second chance at life when parliamentary procedure enabled 
the entire House to vote on the bill. It passed the House by a close margin, and was eventually 
signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. See id.; see alBa Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing 
about the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 220 n.7 (1996) (stating that 
the House included, by only a one vote margin, chemicals that cause chronic health effects). 
17 Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1238. 
18 See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
19 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, at 1 (1986). It was originally intended that the emergency 
planning and community right-to-know sections would amend the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980). 
See ill.; Bee also A.L. Labs. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 1123, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that EPCRA 
was a separate, independent and free-standing environmental statute). 
20 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023. 
21 See ill. §§ 11001-11005. 
22 See Wolf, BUpra note 16, at 220 (calling EPCRA "one of the most significant pieces of 
environmental legislation in decades"). 
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of information about discharge of toxic chemicals has by itself spurred 
competition to reduce releases, quite independently of any govern-
mental regulation.''23 However, EPCRA remains a somewhat obscure 
statute, lacking the popular name recognition of such environmental 
legislation as the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA).24 The lack of knowledge about EPCRA even 
within chemical-utilizing industries makes citizen involvement in fos-
tering compliance with the reporting requirements especially crucial 
to the statute's success.26 
A. Emergency Planning and Notification 
EPCRA's first provision mandates the establishment of state and 
local planning bodies responsible for planning and coordinating emer-
gency responses in the event of a toxic chemical release.26 The gover-
nor of each state is responsible for establishing a "state emergency 
response commission," or SERC, composed of persons with ''technical 
expertise in the emergency response field."27 The state commissions 
also serve as a clearinghouse for information collected pursuant to 
EPCRA and requested by the public.28 
SERCs are required "to designate emergency planning districts 
in order to facilitate preparation and implementation of emergency 
plans.'J29 SERCs also create ''local emergency planning committees," 
or LEPCs, which must include members of law enforcement, 
firefighters, health personnel, media representatives, members of 
28 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 106 (1995). 
24 See Clean Water Act (officially titled Federal Water Pollution Control Act), 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1387 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1994). See also Wolf, supra note 16, at 220. During oral arguments for Steel Co., the 
attorney for the defendant company noted the small company's complete ignorance of EPCRA's 
reporting requirements. See United States Supreme Court Official 'Iranscript, 1997 WL 631058, 
at *3 (Oct. 6,1997), Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96--643). 
26 See Wolf, supra note 16, at 220. 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 11001; see also JAMES M. KuBZA.J, THE EPCRA COMPLIANCE MANUAL at 
32 (Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law, American Bar Association, 
1997). 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § llOOl(a). 
28 See id. Section 11001(a) also requires the appointment of a "coordinator" for such informa-
tion, and the establishment of procedures for processing information requests from the public. 
See id. For the types of information authorized for release to the public, see discussion infra 
involving section 11044 of EPCRA. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
29 42 U.S.C. § llOOl(b). 
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community groups, and owners and operators of facilities subject to 
EPCRA reporting requirements.3o The functions of the LEPCs are: 
(1) developing emergency response plans for chemical emergencies; 
(2) receiving certain reports and notifications required by EPCRA; 
and (3) making such reports available to the public.3! The state com-
missions oversee the local committees and the emergency planning 
districts.32 The coordination of all three bodies is necessary to the 
formation of emergency response plans and to the dissemination of 
information to the communities potentially affected by chemical re-
leases.33 
One critical function of the state commissions is receiving informa-
tion regarding chemical use and storage from owners and operators 
of facilities subject to EPCRA.34 The Administrator of the EPA is 
required, under EPCRA, to promulgate a list of "extremely hazard-
ous substances" (EHS).36 Inclusion of a substance or class of chemicals 
on the EHS list is based on factors such as the toxicity, reactivity, 
volatility, dispersability, combustibility, or flammability of the particu-
lar substance or class.36 The Administrator also sets the "threshold 
planning quantity" (TPQ) for each substance, which represents the 
amount of an EHS list substance which can be present at a facility 
without posing a hazard to the surrounding community in the event 
of an accidental release.37 .Any facility with an EHS present in excess 
of the TPQ is required to notify the SERC of the presence and amount 
of the substance; the SERC then notifies the EPA.38 Thus, a facility 
reporting the presence of an EHS list substance is not required to 
reduce or eliminate the chemical, but merely has a duty to inform the 
public (through the SERCs) about the presence of these dangerous 
chemicals for emergency planning purposes. 
The content of the EHS list has been the subject of litigation. In 
A.L. Laboratories v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia considered a petition to remove the substance bacitracin 
from the EHS list.39 Although the court concluded that it lacked 
110 See id. § ll001(c). "Interested persons," if dissatisfied, may petition the SERC to modify 
the membership of a LEPC. See id. § ll001(d). 
31 See KUSZAJ, 8Upra note 26, at 15. 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § ll003(e) (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
38 See id. § 11003. 
84 See id. § ll002(c). 
35 See id. § ll002(a)(2). 
35 See id. § ll002(a)(4). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § ll002(a)(3). 
38 See id. § ll002(c), (d). 
39 826 F.2d 1123, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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jurisdiction to hear the case given the lack of a jurisdiction-conferring 
provision in the statute,40 the same court in a subsequent case re-
versed its position and considered the appropriateness of an EHS 
classification according to the "arbitrary or capricious" standard.41 In 
Huls America v. Browner, the D.C. Circuit examined a challenge to 
the EPA's inclusion of isophorone diisocryanate (IPDI) on the EHS 
list based on its toxicity alone.42 Acknowledging the EPA's authority 
to revise the EHS list,43 the court analyzed the agency's actions ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court's Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council interpretation of the arbitrary or capri-
cious standard.44 First evaluating whether the EPA's construction of 
EPCRA was permissible, the district court in Huls concluded that 
the EPA need not consider all of the factors mentioned in the stat-
ute-such as volatility and reactivity in addition to toxicity-while 
contemplating revisions to the EHS list, but could evaluate a sub-
stance based solely on its toxicity.46 While the Huts court found some 
deficiencies in the EPA's evidence regarding IPDI's physical and 
chemical properties, detecting ''less than ideal clarity," it nonetheless 
accepted the EPA's listing of the substance as extremely hazardous 
based on the narrow standard of review established in Chevron.46 
According to the court, this permissive approach to the agency's 
classification was consistent with the purpose of the planning compo-
nent of EPCRA; the failure to include a substance on the EHS list 
placed that chemical outside the purview of the statute, thereby 
frustrating local emergency planning should the chemical in fact be 
dangerous.47 
40 See id. at 1125. The court concluded that because EPCRA is a free-standing statute, 
jurisdiction could not lie as a function of a CERCLA provision. See id. 
41 See Ruls America, Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 447; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(4). 
44 See Huts America, 83 F.3d at 450 (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.s. 837, 842-43 (1984». If Congress' intent is unclear regarding the 
precise question of statutory interpretation decided by an agency, then a court reviewing such 
a decision only inquires whether ''the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute." See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
45 See Huts America, 83 F.3d at 450. 
46 See id. at 454. 
47 See id. at 451. The court drew attention to the fact that the TPQ for a substance also plays 
a role in the EPA's evaluation. If the risk that a release of the substance will result in off-site 
exposure is low, then the TPQ will correspondingly be much higher. Despite the low risk, the 
substance still warrants inclusion on the ERS list if the possible effects of such an exposure 
(though unlikely) are serious. See id. 
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Armed with information about the presence of EHS list chemicals 
in the community, the SERCs and LEPCs are required to formulate 
an emergency response plan.48 Section ll003(c) of EPCRA requires 
that the following information be included in the emergency response 
plan: (1) identification of facilities where EHS list chemicals are pre-
sent, and routes used to transport such substances; (2) procedures to 
be followed by owners and operators of such facilities and by medical 
personnel in the event of a release of an EHS; (3) designation of 
a community emergency coordinator; (4) procedures for providing 
prompt notice of a release to the public and to key personnel; (5) 
methods for determining the occurrence of a release, and the popula-
tion affected by the release; (6) descriptions of emergency equipment 
and facilities in the community, and identification of the persons re-
sponsible at each facility for such equipment; (7) evacuation plans and 
alternative traffic routes; (8) training programs for medical and emer-
gency planning personnel;49 and (9) methods and schedules for exer-
cising the emergency plan.5O The statute also requires the LEPCs to 
provide a copy of the emergency plan to the SERC,51 and it requires 
the owners or operators of facilities subject to EPCRA to designate 
a facility representative to coordinate implementation of the emer-
gency plan with the LEPC.52 In addition, the national response team 
provides guidance documents for assistance in formulating the local 
plan, while regional response teams are responsible for evaluating 
those plans.53 
The final aspect of the statute's planning component involves emer-
gency notification.54 If an EHS is released, the facility must notify the 
community emergency coordinator and the affected LEPCS.55 The 
facility owner must disclose the circumstances surrounding the re-
lease, including the chemicals involved, the amounts released, the 
area impacted, and other relevant information.56 Following this notice, 
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 11003. 
49 See id. § llOO5(a). Section 11005 also requires that federal officials provide training for 
federal, state, and local personnel in ''hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, fire preven-
tion and control, disaster response, long-term disaster recovery, national security, technological 
and natural hazards, and emergency processes." Federal funds are authorized to support state 
and local training. See id. 
60 See id. § llOO3(c)(1)-(9). 
61 See id. § llOO3(e). 
62 See id. § ll003(d). 
63 See 42 U.S.C. § llOO3(f), (g). 
64 See id. § 11004. 
66 See id. § l1004(b). 
66 See id. The statute requires notice of a release if notice is also required under CERCLA, 
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the owner or operator of the facility must also provide written notice 
to the LEPCs of the release, along with a statement regarding any 
action taken to mitigate the effects of the release, health risks asso-
ciated with exposure to the substance, and advice regarding medical 
attention to exposed individuals.57 The statute does not require no-
tification, however, when the release "results in exposure to persons 
solely within the site or sites on which the facility is located."68 Release 
notification is a crucial part of the emergency plan, representing the 
first step in managing and alleviating the effects of an accidental 
release. 
B. Reporting Requirements 
In addition to contingency planning, EPCRA establishes reporting 
requirements for facilities using, manufacturing, or storing certain 
types of chemicals. 59 Three principal reports must be filed with the 
EPA: (1) material safety data sheets;60 (2) chemical inventory forms;61 
and (3) toxic chemical release forms.62 These reports provide the foun-
dation for community right-to-know information.53 
42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). If notice is not required by CERCLA, the owner of the facility is still 
required to report the release if it is not a "federally pennitted release," i.e., pursuant to federal 
pennit, under CERCLA, § 9601(10), and if the release is in an amount in excess of a quantity 
(the "reportable quantity" or RQ) determined by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § llOO4(a)(2). Thus, 
release of some EHS list chemicals are not subject to reporting requirements under CERCLA 
but still require notification under EPCRA. As a result, facilities must be aware of and comply 
with both CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements. See Paul Hagen, Update on the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, SB25 ALI-ABA 73, 79-84 (1996). 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 11004(c). 
68 See ill. § llOO4(a)(4) (exempted releases); see also 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(2)(1) (1998) (stating the 
exemption applies to "any release which results in exposure to persons solely within the 
boundaries of the facility"). 
69 See 42 U.S.C §§ 11021-11023. 
60 See ill. § 11021. 
61 See ill. § 11022. 
62 See ill. § 11023. 
63 See ill. §§ 11021-11023. There has been only one challenge to the general validity of the 
reporting requirements. In Gossner Foods, Inc. v. EPA, 918 F. Supp. 359, 361~2 (D. Utah 1996), 
an entity which was subject to the reporting requirements of EPCRA charged that the report-
ing requirements conflicted with the mandates of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 42 
U.S.C. § 3512. The court rejected the challenge to EPCRA, stating that the PRA applies only 
to agencies and is inapplicable to infonnation explicitly imposed by congressional statute. See 
Gossner Foods, 918 F. Supp. at 3~2. 
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1. Material Safety Data Sheets64 
The first reporting requirement for facilities covered by EPCRA 
involves material safety data sheets (MSDSs), as designated in the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act6li (OSHA).66 OSHA requires a 
MSDS for ''hazardous chemicals" defined as "any chemical which is a 
physical hazard or health hazard."67 If a facility is required under 
OSHA to submit MSDSs for hazardous chemicals on its premises, 
EPCRA requires a one-time submission68 of the sheets by the facility 
to the LEPC, the SERC, and the local fire department.69 In lieu of 
providing an MSDS, a facility can comply with EPCRA by providing 
a list of hazardous chemicals stored or used on-site to the SERC and 
LEPC. This list must include the name of each chemical along with 
its hazardous components.70 
The EPCRA reporting requirements for hazardous chemicals are 
somewhat narrower than those of OSHA. First, EPCRA grants the 
EPA the authority to set minimum thresholds for hazardous chemi-
cals below which no facility is required to report.71 Also, certain cate-
gories of chemical compositions are exempted from the definition of 
"hazardous chemicals."72 The following are specifically excluded from 
the reporting requirement: (1) foods and drugs regulated by the Food 
and Drug Administration; (2) solids in manufactured items; (3) con-
sumer products; (4) laboratory chemicals; and (5) agricultural chemi-
cals such as fertilizers.73 Upon the request of any person, the LEPC 
will furnish a copy of the MSDS or list of hazardous chemicals as 
required by the statute.74 
64 See generally KUSZAJ, supra note 26, at 101-59. 
65 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970). 
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 11021. 
67 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1998). 
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 11021. Facilities are required to update (Le., re-submit) the MSDS if the 
amounts or types of chemicals change. See id. 
69 See id. § 1l021(a)(I); see also KUSZAJ, supra note 26, at 102. 
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(2). 
71 See id. § 11021(b). The current threshold is 10,000 pounds for most MSDS substances, and 
5()() pounds (or the TPQ) for EHS list chemicals. The forms must be filed within three months 
of the chemicals being present in the facility. See id. 
72 See id. § 11021(e). 
73 See id. § 11021(e)(1}-(5). Also, OSHA itself excludes certain items from the reporting 
requirement. By extension, items excluded under OSHA are thereby excluded from EPCRA's 
reporting requirement. See KUSZAJ, supra note 26, at 106-07. 
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 11021(c)(2). 
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2. Chemical Inventory Forms76 
The second reporting requirement under EPCRA is chemical in-
ventory reporting.76 Emergency and hazardous chemical inventory 
forms encompass the same hazardous chemicals for which OSHA 
requires MSDSs.77 Each March 1, a facility subject to EPCRA must 
submit to the LEPC, the SERC, and the local fire department the 
amounts and locations of each chemical. 78 There are two types of 
inventory forms, Tier I and Tier 11.79 All facilities with the hazardous 
chemicals present on site must provide Tier I information, which 
includes the following: (1) an estimate of the maximum amount of 
hazardous chemicals present at the facility during the preceding year; 
(2) an estimate of the average daily amount of hazardous chemicals 
present at the facility; and (3) the general location of each hazardous 
chemical.80 Tier I information is submitted by categories of chemicals, 
rather than for individual chemicals.81 
Tier II information includes more particularized data than Tier I, 
and requires a brief description of the manner of storage of each 
individual hazardous chemical as well as the chemical's specific loca-
tion in the facility.82 Tier II information, however, need only be pro-
vided upon request to SERCs, LEPCs, local fire departments, or 
government officials, in lieu of the Tier I form.83 Tier II information 
may be provided to the public if such information is requested in 
writing and is in the possession of the LEPCs or SERC.84 Any Tier 
II information which is not in the possession of the LEPCs or SERC 
and which pertains to a hazardous chemical stored in a facility in an 
amount less than 10,000 pounds will only be provided upon a showing 
of "general need for the information."86 
76 See generally KUSZAJ, supra note 26, at 161-73. 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 11022. 
77 See ill. § 11022(a)(I); see also supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text for discussion of 
OSHA's requirements. 
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(2). 
79 See ill. § 11022(d)(I), (2). Some states have modified the reporting provisions by allowing 
electronic media submissions, permitting alteration of the standard reporting format, and man-
dating fees. See Hagen, supra note 56, at 96. 
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(I)(B). 
81 See ill. § 11022(d)(I)(A). 
82 See ill. § 11022(d)(2). 
88 See ill. § U022(e)(1), (2). 
84 See ill. § 11022(e)(3)(B). 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e)(3)(C). 
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3. Toxic Release Forms86 
The most important and controversial87 of EPCRA's reporting re-
quirements is the toxic chemical release form (Form R).88 This re-
quires annual reporting to the EPA of any off-site transfers or re-
leases of listed "toxic chemicals."89 The information collected under 
this provision is compiled into the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), and 
TRI data is made accessible to the public.90 Form R includes the name 
and business of the facility, a certification by a management official of 
the facility attesting to its accuracy and completeness, the maximum 
amount of each toxic chemical used, stored, or processed at the facility, 
the waste treatment or disposal methods for the chemical.employed, 
and the annual quantity of the toxic chemical entering each environ-
mental medium (i.e., air, water, etc.).91 Facilities must complete and 
submit to the EPA and to a designated state official a Form R for each 
TRI chemical listed in the statute which was manufactured, pro-
cessed, or used in quantities exceeding the toxic chemical release 
threshold quantity during the preceding year.92 The threshold quan-
tity for reporting toxic chemicals used at a facility is 10,000 pounds of 
the chemical, while chemicals imported, manufactured or processed 
at the facility have a higher reporting threshold of 25,000 pounds.93 
Facilities are subject to the TRI reporting requirement if they have 
ten or more employees, are in specified Industrial Classification 
Codes,94 and have used, processed, or manufactured the included toxic 
chemicals in excess of the threshold reporting quantities during the 
preceding calendar year.96 
86 See generally KUSZAJ, supra note 26, at 176-852. 
87 See Selcraig, 8Upra note 2, at 94 (discussing attempts by some members of Congress to cut 
the list of TRI chemicals). 
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 11023. 
89 See id. § 11023(a). 
90 See id. § 11023(j) (requiring the EPA to establish and maintain a national toxic chemical 
inventory based on data submitted to the Administrator under this section). 
91 See id. § 11023(g). 
92 See id. § 11023(a). Form R must be submitted by July 1 for the preceding calendar year. 
See id. 
98 See 42 U .S.C. § 11023(f). Originally, the threshold quantity for manufacturing or processing 
chemicals was 75,000 pounds, which was lowered to 50,000 pounds on July I, 1989, and to 25,000 
pounds in 1990. See id. In Atlantic StateB Legal Found. v. Buffalo Envelope, a user of toxic 
chemicals challenged on Fifth Amendment due process grounds the different threshold for users 
versus the threshold applied to manufacturers and processors, but the court found that this 
distinction was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See 823 F. Supp. 1065, 
1076 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
94 See KUSZAJ, 8Upra note 26, at 177 (referring to Standard Industrial Codes 20--39). 
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(I)(A). In Kaw Valley, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
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As originally enacted, the TRI list of covered chemicals included 
309 individual chemicals and twenty categories of chemicals.96 Until 
1994, the total number of chemicals included on the list rose by only 
four,97 but in 1994 the EPA added 286 chemicals pursuant to its rule-
making authority.98 The text of the statute provides guidelines for 
adding new chemicals to the TRI list.99 A chemical may be added if: 
(1) it is known to cause significant, adverse, acute human health ef-
fects;100 (2) it is known or predicted to cause cancer, reproductive 
dysfunctions, neurological disorders, inheritable genetic mutations, or 
other chronic health effects;lOl or (3) because of its toxicity, persist-
ence in the environment, or tendency to bioaccumulate, it has a sig-
nificant adverse effect on the environment.lOO 
The addition of chemicals to the TRI list has produced some con-
troversy, and has prompted unsuccessful attempts by some members 
of the United States Congress to legislatively reduce the number of 
chemicals included.103 Moreover, the chemical industry has not suc-
ceeded in getting chemicals de-listed through litigation either.l04 In 
Troy Corporation v. Browner, various chemical companies and asso-
ciations brought suit to invalidate the most recent spate of EPA 
rulemaking, which culminated in the addition of 286 chemicals to the 
TRI list.106 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia upheld almost all of the EPA's additions, finding that the 
EPA's refusal to "de-list"106 the chemicals was not arbitrary or capri-
cious, and that the procedures utilized were reasonable.107 However, 
844 F. SUpp. 705 (D. Kan. 1994), the district court upheld the EPA's definition of an "employee" 
under EPCRA as a person performing 2,000 hours per year of full-time equivalent employment. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 372.3 (1998). 
96 See 42 U.S.C. § llOO3(c)j see also Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
97 See 'I'roy, 120 F.3d at 281. 
98 Section llOO3(d) of EPCRA authorizes the EPA to revise the list. See 1'roy, 120 F.3d at 281. 
99 See 42 U.S.C. § llOO3(d)(2). The EPA determines whether the statutory criteria are evident 
in a particular substance, based on "generally accepted scientific principles or laboratory tests, 
or appropriately designed and conducted epidemiological or other population studies." Id. 
§ llOO3(d)(2)(C). Deletions from the list are judged on the basis of the absence of the same 
criteria applied to additions. See id. § llOO3(d)(3). 
100 See id. § llOO3(d)(2)(A). 
101 See id. § llOO3(d)(2)(B). 
III! See ill. § llOO3(d)(2)(C). 
103 See Selcraig, supra note 2, at 94. 
104 See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 280, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (refusing to de-list 
all but 2 of 286 chemicals added by the EPA in 1994). 
1C1iSee id. 
106 See 42 U.S.C. § ll023(e) (specifying the petition procedure for requesting a chemical's 
deletion from or addition to the TRI list). 
ICY! See 1'roy,12O F.3d at 287. 
400 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:387 
the court did find that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously with 
respect to two individual chemicals added, because it departed from 
EPA precedent with respect to one/08 and did not comply with EPA 
regulations regarding scientific studies with respect to the other.l09 
4. Notice to the Public 
One other EPCRA provision regarding both the emergency plans 
and reporting forms warrants comment. Section 11044 of the statute 
requires that each emergency plan, MSDS, inventory form, TRI form, 
and follow-up emergency notice be made available to the general 
public.uO Additionally, the same section requires that each LEPC 
publish annually a notice to the community in the local paper that such 
items have been filed by facilities in the area.lll 
C. Enforcement Provisions 
Like a host of other environmental statutes, EPCRA has a dual-
prong enforcement mechanism.u2 First, the Administrator of the EPA 
can initiate administrative or judicial proceedings against the owner 
or operator of a facility to remedy noncompliance with EPCRA.U3 
Second, any person may initiate a civil suit against a non-complying 
facility, in effect acting as a "private attorney general."U4 This section 
will explore both aspects of the statutory enforcement mechanism. U6 
The main EPA enforcement provision in EPCRA establishes civil 
penalties for emergency planning violations, U6 civil and administra-
tive penalties for reporting violations,117 and civil, administrative, and 
criminal penalties for emergency notification violations.u8 The widest 
range of remedies available for emergency notification violations sug-
gests that Congress was most worried about this type of noncompli-
108 See id. at 29l. 
109 See id. at 293. 
110 See 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a). 
111 See id. § 11044(b). 
112 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994). 
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 11045. 
114 See id. § 11046. 
116 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11041-11043, 11047-11049. Other miscellaneous provisions of EPCRA fall 
outside the scope of this Comment. They address, briefly, the following subjects: the relationship 
of EPCRA with other laws (§ 11041); trade secrets (§ 11042); information providing to health 
care officials (§ 11043); transportation exemptions (§ 11047); regulations (§ 11048); and defini-
tions (§ 11049). See id. 
116 See id. § 11045(a). 
117 See id. § 11045(c). 
118 See id. § 11045(b). 
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ance. Nonetheless, a facility's failure to notify the appropriate authori-
ties of the presence of an extremely hazardous substance in excess of 
the threshold planning quantity, or its failure to cooperate with emer-
gency planning, may result in a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each 
day of noncompliance if requested by the EPA and imposed by a 
federal court.119 Civil and administrative penalties for emergency no-
tification and reporting violations carry the same potential fine.120 
Criminal penalties of up to a $25,000 fine and two years in prison may 
be imposed on individuals who ''knowingly and willfully" fail to pro-
vide emergency notification as required by section 11004.121 The vari-
ous avenues of enforcement available to the EPA create flexibility, 
allowing the EPA to pursue harsher penalties in court where war-
ranted. 
The second enforcement mechanism of EPCRA is the citizen suit 
provision.122 This provision authorizes any individual to sue the owner 
or operator of a facility for the failure to: 
(i) submit a follow-up emergency notice under section ll004(c) 
... , 
(ii) submit a material safety data sheet or a list under section 
1l021(a) ... ; 
(iii) complete and submit an inventory form under section l1022(a) 
. . . containing Tier I information as described in section 
1l022(d)(1) ... unless such requirement does not apply ... ; or (iv) 
complete and submit a toxic chemical release form under section 
l1023(a).123 
There are several additional, important provisions relative to citi-
zen suits. First, the federal courts have jurisdiction over EPCRA 
citizen suits.124 Second, no action may be commenced against a facility 
unless the plaintiff has provided sixty days notice of his or her intent 
to sue to the EPA Administrator, the state, and the violator.126 Third, 
a citizen suit may not proceed against a violator if the EPA has 
decided to pursue enforcement itself in administrative or court pro-
119 See id. § 11045(a). 
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b) and (c). 
121 See id. § 11045(b)(4). 
122 See id. § 11046. 
123 [d. § 11046(a)(l)(A). The citizen suit provision also entitles citizens to sue the Administrator 
for failure to make available information provided to him or her pursuant to EPCRA or to 
publish certain forms. See id. § 11046(a)(l)(B) and (C). Citizens may sue the state governor, 
SERC, or LEPCs for failure to respond to a request for information. See id. § 11046(a)(I)(D). 
124 See id. § 11046(c). 
126 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d)(l). This provision becomes important in the context of the debate 
regarding historical violations. See infra notes 246-64 and accompanying text. 
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ceedings.126 Fourth, any monetary penalties imposed by the court are 
paid to the Treasury, not to the individual plaintiffs.l27 Finally, the 
substantially prevailing party may be awarded "costs of litigation 
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) ... whenever 
the court determines such an award is appropriate."l28 These provi-
sions become critical to interpreting the intent and meaning of the 
citizen suit provision in EPCRA.l29 
II. CASES INTERPRETING THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION 
The courts have addressed the citizen suit provision in only a few 
cases.l30 The first cases to evaluate the constitutionality of the provi-
sion all concluded that section 11046 is constitutional.l3l In Atlantic 
States Legal Foundation v. Buffalo Envelope, an environmental pro-
tection group filed a citizen suit against the defendant corporation for 
failing to comply with EPCRA's reporting requirement.l32 The defen-
dant sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that the citizen suit 
provision violated the principle of separation of powers and the Ap-
pointments Clause of the United States Constitution by granting to 
private individuals powers that are vested exclusively in the execu-
tive branch.l83 Beginning with the notion that the separation of pow-
ers doctrine applies to inter-branch relationships within the federal 
government, the federal district court concluded that the doctrine did 
not apply when Congress vested enforcement power in private indi-
viduals.l34 A constitutional concern only arises, according to the court, 
when Congress reserves to itself the power to control or supervise 
the enforcement of the rights it created.l35 In addition, the court noted 
that the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Actl36 had been 
126 See 42 u.s.c. § 11046(e). 
127 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1241 (7th Cir. 1996). 
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(0. 
129 See generally Section II infra (discussing the proper interpretation of the citizen suit 
provision of EPCRA). 
1111 See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1238. Only about twenty cases have been filed in federal court under 
EPCRA. See id. 
131 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Buffalo Envelope, 823 F. Supp. 1065 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); 
Delaware Valley 'lbxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Atlantic 
States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
132 See Buffalo Envelope, 823 F. Supp. at 1066--67. 
133 See id. at 1073. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 1073-74 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983». 
136 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). 
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upheld, and asserted that the CW Ns provision is very similar to 
EPCRNs.137 
The following subsections discuss specific interpretative issues ad-
dressed by the federal courts with respect to the citizen suit provision 
of EPCRA. 
A. Notice Requirement 
The Supreme Court has held, in the context of other environmental 
statutes with similar notice provisions, that compliance with the 
sixty-day notice requirement is a necessary prerequisite to the filing 
of a citizen suit.l38 In the context of EPCRA, one district court has 
mandated that the notice provision be satisfied by each plaintiff in the 
suit.139 In Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol, two environmental 
groups filed suit against the defendant for failure to comply with 
EPCRA.l40 Land and Water Fund of the Rockies (LAW) complied 
with the notice requirement, but Idaho Sporting Congress (lSC) did 
not.141 ISC argued that LAW's pre-suit notice letter satisfied the 
notice requirement because the "notice requirement attaches to the 
lawsuit-not the plaintiff."l42 In rejecting this argument, the court 
noted that one of the purposes of the notice provision-providing the 
parties with an opportunity to settle---could not be accomplished 
unless the defendant knew the identities of all of the plaintiffs.l43 Thus, 
each plaintiff was independently required to satisfy the sixty-day 
notice requirement.l44 
187 See Buffalo Envelope, 823 F. Supp. at 1074 (citing Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987), which upheld the constitutionality of Clean Water 
Act's citizen suit provision). 
138 See infra notes 179--86 and accompanying text (discussing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 
493 U.S. 20 (1989». 
139 See Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Idaho 1996). 
140 See itt. 
141 See itt. at 694. 
142 See itt. (citing Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889, 913 (N.D. Cal. 
1994), affd, 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, _ U.S. -1117 S. Ct. 789 (1997». 
143 See Idaho Sporting Congress, 952 F. Supp. at 695. The court in Idaho Sporting Congress 
was also persuaded by the Supreme Court's reading of the notice provision in Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989), and the 9th Circuit's interpretation of Hallstrom as 
requiring courts to "strictly construe" notice provisions. See generally Washington Trout v. 
McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1995); see also notes 178--85 infra and accompanying 
text. 
144 See Idaho Sporting Congress, 952 F. Supp. at 694. 
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B. Standing 
In the area of environmental law, the issue of standing with respect 
to citizen suits is a contentious one. l46 In Atlantic States Legal Found. 
v. Buffalo Envelope, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff, an envi-
ronmental protection organization, lacked standing to sue under EP-
CRA for violations of the reporting requirement.146 While the defen-
dant characterized plaintiff's injury as "conjectural and abstract," the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had interfered with its members' 
"right to know" as protected by the statute.147 The court enumerated 
the various requirements for standing: the existence of a concrete and 
particularized injury, a nexus between the injury and the defendant's 
conduct, and the redressability of the injury by the requested relief. l48 
Noting that standing is always a prerequisite to a federal forum,149 the 
court determined that the plaintiff had standing to sue.1OO Members of 
the plaintiff's organization (which included persons who were re-
quired to utilize EPCRA data for their jobS)151 had individually and 
collectively suffered injury by the defendant's failure to file the re-
portS.I52 Further, these injuries could be traced to the defendant's 
conduct and redressed by such remedies as an injunction and civil 
penalties.l53 Thus, the plaintiff was allowed to pursue its claim. 1M 
C. Penalties for Noncompliance 
In Williams v. Leybold Technologies, the defendant challenged the 
imposition of monetary penalties for its failure to file the requisite 
EPCRA reports, alleging that the fines (then at a maximum of $10,000 
per day) were so punitive as to constitute a criminal penalty.l55 Given 
145 See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 900-15 (1990) (Blackmun, J. dissent-
ing). 
146 See 823 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
147 See id. at 1067. 
148 See id. 
149 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 363 (1911) (holding that standing is required 
pursuant to Article III "case or controversy" requirement). 
150 See Buffalo Envelope, 823 F. Supp at 1071. 
161 See id. at 1070. One of the members of the Plaintiff organization served as the Commis-
sioner of the Department of Emergency Services for Erie County and required EPCRA 
information in order to carry out his job; the Court deemed these facts sufficient to constitute 
"individualized injury." See id. 
162 See id. at 1070. 
163 See id. at 1072. 
164 See id. at 1077. 
166 See 784 F. Supp. 765, 76~9 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
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Congress' clear intention to create a civil remedy and its authorization 
of criminal penalties for other reporting violations, the court deter-
mined that the fine was not so punitive as to transform a civil remedy 
into a criminal one.1OO 
D. Attorney's Fees in Citizen Suits 
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Whiting Roll-Up Door, 
where the parties ultimately agreed to a settlement, the court was 
left to determine only the issue of attorneys' fees. 107 The court first 
examined the fees award provision of EPCRA, section 1l046(t), which 
authorizes reasonable attorney and expert witness fees for the "sub-
stantially prevailing party."1OO Though the parties had settled the case, 
the court found that the plaintiff was still entitled to fees because the 
settlement was most favorable to that party.109 In order to determine 
what the proper award should be, the court calculated the number of 
hours expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 
rate, taking into account such factors as the novelty or difficulty of 
the suit, the number of issues involved, the attorneys' standard rate, 
and awards in similar cases.1OO However, the court ruled that investi-
gations occurring prior to the intent-to-sue notification could not be 
included in the award.161 In awarding over $30,000 in fees to a plaintiff 
in a case which was ultimately settled, the court established that 
EPCRA's fee award provision can be a powerful weapon for citizens 
and environmental groupS.l62 
III. CITIZEN SUITS FOR PURELY HISTORICAL VIOLATIONS 
The most contentious issue surrounding the citizen suit provision 
involves suits for wholly past violations which have been cured prior 
to the filing of the suit.t63 Before the Steel Co. case was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals had split 
156 See id. at 769. 
157 See 1994 WL 236473, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
168 See id. at *1-2. 
169 See id. 
160 See id. The court even allowed attorney's fees for work done by in-house counsel and fees 
for monitoring compliance with the settlement agreement. [d. at *3. 
161 See id. at *3. 
162 See Whiting, 1994 WL 236473, at *4. 
163 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1241--43 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the different rationales for permitting or denying citizen suits alleging only historical 
violations). 
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on the issue.l64 The debate over whether to permit citizen suits to 
proceed once the violation has been cured arises largely as a result of 
litigation between environmental protection or consumer groups and 
private industry.l66 The cases dealing with historical violations are few 
in number, but the results are important in shaping the future of 
citizen suits.1OO In deciding the question, courts have looked to a vari-
ety of factors, such as the language of the statute and the policies 
behind its enactment, to determine whether EPCRA permits suits 
for historical violations. 
A. The Origin of the Debate: Supreme Court Precedent 
The controversy over historical violations began not with an EP-
CRA suit, but with two cases addressing the citizen suit provisions 
of the Clean Water Act167 (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Actl68 (RCRA). In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the United States Supreme Court held 
that citizen suits for purely historical violations of the CWA were not 
permitted by the statute.l69 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
pursued several lines of reasoning. First, the Court examined the 
plain language of the statute, which permitted citizen suits against 
any person alleged "to be in violation of" the statute.170 While noting 
that the language was somewhat less than clear, the Court neverthe-
less concluded that the language implied a continuing or intermittent 
violation (such that the violation was likely to recur).171 Second, the 
164 See id. at 1244 (interpreting § 11046 as pennitting citizen suits for wholly past violations); 
Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 
1995) (holding that § 11046 does not pennit such suits). 
166 See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. 
168 A number of environmental groups maintain that disallowing citizen suits for historical 
violations will "effectively nullify the citizen suit provision of EPCRA." See Brief for Respondent 
at *19, 1997 WL 348462 (1997), Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) 
(No. 96-643); see also Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244-45 (stating that citizen suits must be allowed to 
proceed even after the violator cures so that citizens can recover the costs associated with the 
suit). This position assumes that citizens will not go through the costs associated with filing suit 
if they know that the suit will be dismissed once the violator cures. See id. at 1244-45. 
167 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). 
168 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994). 
169 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987). 
1'10 See id. at 57-58. 
17l See id. at 57. The Court's reading of the statute was influenced by the fact that Congress 
could have easily phrased the section differently if it meant to allow suits for historical violation, 
by using the construction ''to have violated." The Court also focused on the continuous use of 
the present tense. [d. at 57, 59. 
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Court determined that this reading was consistent with congressional 
intent, noting that "Congress frequently characterized the citizen suit 
provisions as 'abatement' provisions or as injunctive measures."172 
Also, the bar on citizen suits in the event of the EPA taking action 
against the violator presupposes that the citizen suit was intended to 
supplement, not supplant, governmental action.173 Moreover, allowing 
the citizen suit to proceed for historical violations could also nega-
tively impact the EPA's dealmaking authority, interfering with agree-
ments between the violator and the EPA to forgo civil penalties in 
exchange for some concession.174 The Court acknowledged that a citi-
zen suit could proceed, despite the defendant's alleged curing of the 
violation, if the plaintiff alleges a continuing violation or a likelihood 
that the violation will recur.175 
In determining whether EPCRA permits suits for historical viola-
tions, the courts have looked to EPCRA's notice provision for guid-
ance in divining the meaning of the statute.176 Thus, the Supreme 
Court's early pronouncements regarding the function of a similar 
notice provision in a different environmental statute would later 
prove instructive.177 
In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, the Supreme Court evaluated 
the sixty-day notice provision in RCRA to determine whether notice 
was an absolute prerequisite to the filing of the suit.178 The plaintiff 
had failed to notify the EPA and relevant state agencies of his intent 
to sue.179 In holding that the sixty-day notice provision was a neces-
sary precondition to a citizen suit, the Court rejected a more flexible 
approach whereby a suit could proceed even if the plaintiff did not 
comply with the notice provision, if there had been notice in fact or if 
the court stayed the proceedings for sixty days.l80 Hallstrom dis-
cussed several reasons for the notice provision, stating that notice to 
the EPA and state agencies was required in order for the EPA to have 
172 [d. at 61. 
173 [d. at 60. 
174 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. 
176 See id. at 64. 
176 See notes 247~5 infra and accompanying text (discussing the effect of EPCRA's sixty-day 
notice requirement on citizen suits alleging historical violations). 
177 See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989); see also Atlantic States Legal 
Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing Hallstrom). 
178 See Hallstrmn, 493 U.S. at 23. 
179 See id. at 23-24. 
ISO See id. at 25. The flexible reading of the notice provision was adopted by the Third Circuit 
in Proffitt v. Bristol Cmnm'rs, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (1985). 
408 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:387 
time to decide if it wanted to pursue a remedy against the violator, 
thereby precluding the citizen suit.181 Notice to the violator, on the 
other hand, only made sense if the sixty-day period was intended to 
give the violator time to remedy the violation.l82 The Hallstrom opin-
ion cited Gwaltney, stating that the notice provision gives the alleged 
violator "an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with 
the Act and thus render unnecessary a citizen suit."l83 The Court, as 
a result, dismissed the suit because the plaintiff failed to observe the 
notice provision.l84 Thus, this case highlighted the functions of the 
notice provision. The federal courts would later follow or distinguish 
Hallstrom in discussing the functions of EPCRA's notice provision as 
it impacted suits alleging only historical violations.l85 
Since Gwaltney and Hallstrom, the courts have divided on whether 
to allow citizen suits for past violations of EPCRA which have been 
cured prior to the start of the suit.l85 The first federal appeals court 
to consider the issue was the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, which, based on the reasoning in Gwaltney, refused to 
allow a citizen suit that alleged only historical violations.187 However, 
a majority of the courts to consider the citizen suit provision have 
sided with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which al-
lowed an EPCRA citizen suit to proceed even though the violator had 
cured the violation. The Seventh Circuit, for reasons discussed in the 
following subsections, has distinguished Gwaltney on the basis of the 
phrasing of and policy behind EPCRA's citizen suit provision.l88 
The following subsections also separately address the effect of the 
notice provision, the standing analysis, the statutory language, the 
legislative history, and public policy on whether EPCRA permits suits 
181 See 493 U.S. at 29. 
183 See id. 
183 See id. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 
(1987». 
184 See id. at 33. 
185 See notes 248-65 infra and accompanying text (discussing EPCRA's sixty-day notice 
provision and the effect of Hallstrom on the interpretation of such provisions). 
186 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996); Atlantic 
States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 1995). 
187 See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 478. 
188 See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1242-44; see also Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan 
Materials Co., 964 F. Supp. 1448, 1452 (D. Colo. 1997); Don't Waste Arizona v. McLane Foods, 
Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972, 978-79 (D. Ariz. 1997); Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol, 852 F. 
Supp. 690,691-92 (D. Idaho 1996); Williams v. Leybold Techs., 784 F. Supp. 765, 768 (N.D. Cal. 
1992); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mtg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745, 753 
(W.D.N.Y.1991). 
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for purely historical violations. This Section revisits the standing and 
notice issues generally presented in Section II, and reevaluates them 
with a focus on the issue of historical violations. 
B. Statutory Language 
The provision of EPCRA authorizing citizen suits permits any per-
son to commence a civil action on his own behalf against an owner or 
operator of a facility for the failure to submit a follow-up emergency 
notice or MSDS, or to complete and submit a chemical inventory form 
or TRI Form R, as required under the relevant sections of EPCRA.189 
While EPCRA's language may appear straightforward, certain ambi-
guities arise when applying this language to situations where the 
"failure to submit" the relevant forms has been remedied prior to the 
commencement of the suit. Defendants have moved for dismissal of 
such suits on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing 
that EPCRA does not authorize suits for wholly past violations.1OO In 
construing this language, the courts have purported to follow the 
"plain meaning" rule of statutory construction and have compared the 
language to other environmental statutes containing similar citizen 
suit provisions.191 
The first court to address the issue of statutory construction was 
the United States District Court for the Western District of New 
York in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Whiting Roll- Up Door 
Manufacturing COrp.l92 Stating that "absent a clearly expressed leg-
islative intention to the contrary, this Court must rely on the words 
of the statute,"l93 the district court concluded that plaintiffs could sue 
for historical violations because the defendant had not complied with 
the filing deadlines.l94 The court looked to the enforcement provisions 
of EPCRA, which provided for civil penalties against any person who 
"violates any requirement[s]" under the statute.195 The court then 
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (referencing § 11004(c) (follow-up emer-
gency notice), § 11021(a) (material safety data sheet), § 11022 (inventory forms), and § 11023(a) 
(toxic chemical release forms». Section 11046 also permits citizen suits against the Administra-
tor, state governor, or SERC, for the failure to publish required materials or to otherwise comply 
with their duties under the statute. See id. 
190 See, e.g., Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 749. 
191 See, e.g., Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1242. 
192 See 772 F. Supp. at 749. 
193 [d. at 750 (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980». 
194 See id. 
196 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c». 
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reasoned that the defendant had "violated the requirements" of the 
statute by not complying with the relevant filing deadlines.lOO While 
focusing on the language of the enforcement provision, the court did 
not explore the language of the citizen suit provision in detaiV97 
The Whiting court's reading of the statute is somewhat problem-
atic, because by its nature, the enforcement provision only supplies a 
remedy after the violation has been established through adjudication. 
The enforcement provision does not purport to define what consti-
tutes a violation; rather, it is the function of the citizen suit provision 
to define the violation.l98 Nonetheless, the court in Williams v. Ley-
bold Technologies, Inc. followed the reasoning in Whiting.lOO The Wil-
liams court stated that "[t]he statute does not expressly require a 
continuing violation at the time of filing suit, but rather authorizes a 
suit against any person who failed to submit an MSDS by the appli-
cable deadline."200 The court in Williams also distinguished the EP-
CRA citizen suit provision from the citizen suit provision of the Clean 
Water Act construed by the Supreme Court in Gwaltney.20l In the 
Clean Water Act, Congress used the present tense, allowing suits 
against persons alleged "to be in violation of" the statute and implying 
a continuing or current violation.202 The Williams court concluded that 
the different phrasing of the two statutes was dispositive, and that 
EPCRA clearly permitted suits for historical violations.202 
After Whiting and Williams, courts construing the statute scruti-
nized the "complete and submit" language of the citizen suit provision 
for guidance on whether suits were authorized for historical viola-
tions.204 The first federal appeals court to address the issue was the 
Sixth Circuit, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical 
Instruments.206 After surveying the reporting requirements of EP-
196 Id. 
197 See Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 750. 
198 See 42 U.S.C. § l1046(a)(I)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
199 See generally Williams v. Leybold Techs., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
200 Id. at 768. 
201 Id. at n.2. For a discussion of Gwaltney, see notes 170-78 supra and accompanying text. 
2a! See id. at 768 n.2. 
200 See id. 
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (a)(l)(A). 
206 See 61 F.3d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1995). This decision has engendered a great deal of criticism 
in legal journals and law reviews. See, e.g., Katarina K. Boer, Comment, United Musical 
Instruments v. The Steel Co.: The Conflict over the Safety of Our Communities and the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Knuw Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1599 (1997); 
Denise Marie Lohmann, Note, The Uncertain Future of Citizen Suits Under EPCRA: Can 
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CRA and noting that the defendant had remedied its failure to file 
the necessary EPCRA reports (specifically the Form R) prior to the 
commencement of the suit, the court turned to the language of the 
citizen suit provision.206 The provision, the court stated, authorizes 
citizen suits for "failure to ... complete and submit [Form Rs] under 
section 11023(a) of this title.''207 According to the court, the emphasis 
of the provision was on the completion and submission of the forms, 
and thus the form is "completed and filed even when it is not timely 
filed."208 Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that the plain 
language of EPCRA did not contemplate citizen suits for wholly past 
violations.209 
The United Musical Instruments court's reading of the citizen suit 
provision was flatly rejected by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel 
CO.21O Rather than directly following United Musical Instruments and 
the holding in Gwaltney, the Seventh Circuit purported to follow the 
"interpretive methodology" of Gwaltney.211 The lesson of Gwaltney, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, was to read a statute according to 
its plain and natural meaning.212 Applying this rule, the court con-
cluded that the language of EPCRA's citizen suit provision differed 
from that of the Clean Water Act at issue in Gwaltney, and thus 
permitted a different interpretation.213 
Citing the other district court cases which interpreted EPCRA's 
provision,214 the Seventh Circuit in Citizens concluded that the most 
"natural" reading of the statute would permit suits for historical 
Citizens Suefor Past Violations of the Statute's Reporting Requirements?, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 
1709 (1997); Michael J. Vahey, Comment, Hazardous Chemical Reporting Under EPCRA- The 
Seventh Circuit Eliminates the "Better Late Than Never" Excuse from Citizen Suits, 29 Loy. 
U. CHI. L.J. 225 (1997). 
206 See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 474. 
207 See id. at 475 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iv». 
206 Id. at 475. 
209 See id. The court in United Musical Instruments also was persuaded that Congress easily 
could have authorized citizen suits for purely historical violations by simply adopting clear 
language, as it did with respect to the broad grant of power contained in the EPA enforcement 
provision. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(4». 
210 See 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996). 
211 See id. at 1242. 
212 See id. 
213 See id. at 1243. 
214 See, e.g., Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993); Williams v. Leybold Techs., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Atlantic States 
Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745, 749 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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violations.216 The United Musical Instruments court had rejected this 
reading, calling it a "hypertechnical parsing" of the statute.216 The 
Citizens court, however, thought EPCRA's "failure to comply" lan-
guage implied that a violation would occur and be actionable once the 
violator missed the deadline, irrespective of whether the violation was 
subsequently cured prior to the actual commencement of the suit.217 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the citizen suit provision 
references the substantive portions of the statute containing the filing 
deadlines, it authorized "citizen suits not only for the failure to com-
plete and submit forms, but for failure to complete and submit forms 
in accordance with the requirements-i.e., deadlines-set forth in the 
referenced sections.''218 
Finally, the Citizens court distinguished the Clean Water Act as 
interpreted by Gwaltney on the basis of the tense employed in the 
statute: the CWA permits suits where a violation "is occurring" (im-
plying an ongoing or current violation), whereas EPCRA authorizes 
suits where a "violation has occurred" (not implying a limitation to 
ongoing violations).219 Thus, the Citizens court concluded that while 
the CWA required a current violation, EPCRA permitted suits for 
historical violations.22O 
After the Citizens court interpreted the citizen suit provision of 
EPCRA as permitting suits for purely historical violations, courts 
addressing the issue generally followed the reasoning in that circuit 
and rejected the United Musical Instruments court's approach.221 
Given the statutory language, referring to violations "under" certain 
sections of the statute, the courts tended to view the filing deadlines 
of those sections as necessary elements of the "complete and submit" 
requirement of the citizen suit provision.222 The federal court for the 
District of Arizona in Don't Waste Arizona v. McLane Foods, gave a 
216 See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1243. 
216 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
217 See 90 F.3d at 1243. 
218Id. 
219 See id. at 1244. 
220 See id. 
221 See Neighbors for a 1bxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964 F. Supp. 1448 (D. 
Colo. 1997); Don't Waste Ariz., Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972 (D. Ariz. 1997); Idaho 
Sporting Congress v. Computrol, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 690 (D. Idaho 1996). 
222 See, e.g., Idaho Sporting Congress, 952 F. Supp. at 692 (stating that Congress used the 
term ''under'' for a reason, in order to incorporate tile filing deadlines as defined in other sections 
of the statute into the citizen suit provision). 
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broad reading to the citizen suit provision, stating that this was 
necessary "when a court is construing a remedial statute ... in order 
to give effect to the statute's remedial purpose."223 As a result, every 
court except the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the citizen suit provi-
sion to allow suits to continue even after the violator has cured the 
violation.224 
C. Standing 
As mentioned earlier, the cases reviewed in Section II generally did 
not address the issue of standing for citizen suits alleging purely 
historical violations.226 Only three cases contain any mention of stand-
ing, all of which concluded that the plaintiffs had met the require-
ments of Article III of the United States Constitution.226 
Article III limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to "Cases" 
and "Controversies."227 The doctrine of standing has developed to 
identify those disputes which rise to the level of a case or controversy 
as those terms are used in the Constitution.228 The three requirements 
for standing are: (1) a concrete and particularized injury; (2) a connec-
tion between the injury and the defendant's conduct; and (3) a likeli-
hood that the injury may be redressed by judicial remedy.229 
The first court to squarely address the standing issue for suits in-
volving purely historical violations in EPCRA was the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Delaware Valley Toxies 
223 950 F. Supp. at 976. 
224 The Citizens case was dismissed, however, on appeal to the Supreme Court. See Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1020 (1998). 
225 See supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney and Hallstrom). 
226 See McLane Foods, 950 F. Supp. at 979-81; Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hast-
ings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132, 1138-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993). As discussed earlier in this Comment, the 
court in Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope also addressed the standing 
issue, in the context of a citizen suit involving a continuing failure by the defendant to file the 
required EPCRA reporting forms. See 823 F. Supp. 1065, 1067-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). The reason 
for other courts' failure to address the standing issue-a prerequisite to the federal forum-is 
unclear; possibly, the issue was not raised by the defendants. 
227 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The standing requirement is often justified by separation of 
powers doctrine as a means of limiting the Court's role to that envisioned by the Framers. See 
generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization 
of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK u. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
228 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
229 See id. These three requirements for standing-injury in fact, causation, and redressabil-
ity-are the "irreducible minimum" set of requirements and the burden is on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate them. See generally Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
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Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings.230 The court in Delaware Valley first 
noted that an organization with a long history of advocacy in the area 
of environmental law does not have standing to sue merely on the 
basis of its interest in the environment.2:11 The court looked to EPCRA 
for guidance on what type of injury is cognizable under the statute, 
concluding that given EPCRA's informational function, the failure to 
provide those reports required by the statute would constitute a 
concrete injury for standing purposes.232 According to the court, the 
plaintiffs in Delaware Valley had suffered a number of injuries as a 
result of the defendant's failure to provide the reports in a timely 
fashion, including the plaintiff's need to spend time and money to 
discover the defendant's violation, the resulting reduction in time 
available to educate and disseminate information about their pro-
grams, and the ignorance about the defendant's activity among the 
members of the organization who lived and worked in close proximity 
to the defendant's plant.233 Further, the court concluded that these 
injuries were directly traceable to the defendant's failure to file the 
reports in a timely fashion.234 The final requirement for standing, 
redressability, was also met despite the defendant's cure of the viola-
tion.236 The court noted that injunctive relief, civil penalties, attorneys' 
fees, and a declaratory judgment were all remedies available to the 
plaintiff.236 Despite the fact that the injunction was prospective in 
nature and the civil penalties were payable to the Treasury Depart-
ment and not the plaintiff, the court nonetheless held that these 
remedies were sufficient to redress the plaintiff's historical injury.237 
As in Delaware Valley, the federal district court in Don't Waste 
Arizona v. McLane Foods also determined that the plaintiffs had 
standing to sue for a purely historical violation.238 The court discussed 
2lIJ See 813 F. Supp. at 1132. 
281 See id. at 1139. 
282 See id. 
238 See id. at 1140. 
284 See id. 
286 See Delaware Valley 7bxics Coalition, 813 F. Supp. at 1140. 
286 See id. at 1141. 
237 See id. 
288 950 F. Supp. 972, 979-81 (D. Ariz. 1997). The case also discussed the requirements of 
"representational standing," where an organization may demonstrate standing in its own right 
providing that: (1) the members of the organization must have standing to sue in their own 
right; (2) the interests sought are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires that the members participate in the suit 
individually. See id. at 980. 
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the requirements of "representational standing," where an organiza-
tion may demonstrate standing in its own right: (1) the members of 
the organization individually must have standing to sue; (2) the inter-
ests sought must be germane to the organization's purpose; and 
(3) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, should require 
that the members participate in the suit individually.239 After deter-
mining that these three requirements for representational standing 
were met,240 the court concluded that the Article III standing require-
ment was met without considering the causation or redressability 
issues.241 Thus, both Delaware Valley and McLane Foods, though 
addressing the standing issue, had some gaps in reasoning: Delaware 
Valley gave short shrift to the redressability issue,242 and McLane 
Foods failed entirely to discuss either causation or redressability.243 
D. Sixty-Day Notice Provision 
Courts evaluating the viability of EPCRA citizen suits for historical 
violations have also looked to the sixty-day notice requirement to give 
meaning to the statute. Two main views, consistent with the Supreme 
Court's lead in Gwaltney and Hallstrom, have developed, in line with 
the Sixth Circuit's approach in United Musical Instruments or with 
the Seventh Circuit's approach as expressed in Citizens.244 
Citing Gwaltney and Hallstrom repeatedly,24fi the court in United 
Musical Instruments viewed the sixty-day notice provision as serv-
ing a dual function: notice to the EPA gives the agency the opportu-
nity to file suit itself, thereby precluding a citizen suit, while notice to 
the violator allows him or her the opportunity to remedy the violation 
prior to the suit.246 Notice to the alleged violator, according to the 
court, becomes gratuitous if suits can survive based on wholly past 
239 See id.; see also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
240 See McLane Foods, 950 F. Supp. at 980--81. 
241 See id. at 981. Other opinions addressing the standing issue in the context of organizations 
as plaintiffs have still required the three main prongs of standing-injury, causation, and 
redressability-in addition to the "representational standing" requirements. See generally Lu-
jan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
242 See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. 
244 See Atlantic State Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 
1995); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). 
246 See supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales for Gwaltney and 
Hallstrom). 
246 See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 476. 
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violations.247 Thus, the court interpreted the notice provision as evi-
dence of Congress' intent not to permit suits for historical violations. 
A number of courts have come to the opposite conclusion. In Atlan-
tic States Legal Foundation v. Whiting Roll-Up Door, the court dis-
tinguished Gwaltney even though the statute construed in that case, 
the Clean Water Act, had a similar notice provision.248 The court found 
it significant that Congress had amended the Clean Air Act (CAA)249 
after Gwaltney to specifically permit citizen suits for historical viola-
tions.260 The court reasoned that Congress' amending the CAA to 
permit suits for historical violations, while at the same time leaving 
the notice provision intact, indicated that the notice provision was not 
incompatible with the concept of suits for historical violations, there-
by undercutting the Supreme Court's analysis in Gwaltney.261 
However, this precise reasoning was rejected by the United Musi-
cal Instruments court: 
Although this argument has a certain logic, it is unpersuasive 
since one can argue with at least equal force that by amending the 
Clean Air Act, but failing also to amend EPCRA, Congress in-
tended to limit EPCRA's citizen suit provision to violations exist-
ing at the time the suit is filed.262 
Thus, the United Musical Instruments court refused to alter the 
reasoning in Gwaltney and Hallstrom regarding the notice provision, 
absent a clear legislative mandate in the form of an amendment to 
EPCRA, not some other environmental statute.263 
In Citizens, the Seventh Circuit did not respond to United Musical 
Instruments' criticism regarding the implications of the amendment 
to the Clean Air Act, but merely reiterated the same reasoning as the 
court in Whiting.2M The Citizens court chose to hypothesize about the 
247 See id. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 
59--60 (1987». 
248 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door, 772 F. Supp. 745, 753 (W.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
249 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
250 See Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 753. 
251 See id. 
25\! See United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 477. 
25IIId. 
264 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). The court 
stated: "[According to the Supreme Court,] allowing citizens to sue after violations ceased would 
defeat the purpose of the notice provision .•.. This line of reasoning is no longer as compelling 
as it was when Gwaltney was decided. Since then, Congress has expressly intended precisely 
that result [by amending the Clean Air Act]." Id. The court did not respond to the Sixth Circuit's 
argument that the failure to similarly amend EPCRA mitigated against this analysis. 
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function of the notice provision.256 The court in Citizens pointed to a 
number of other functions potentially served by the notice provi-
sion-aside from giving the violator time to cure-including providing 
an opportunity for the alleged violator to rectify false information and 
to limit its exposure.256 In addition, according to the Seventh Circuit 
in Citizens, the notice requirement preserves the EPA's enforcement 
discretion and promotes settlement between the parties.257 Thus, the 
court determined that the notice requirement was not rendered 
meaningless by allowing citizen suits for historical violations to pro-
ceed.268 
The only court to address the Sixth Circuit's argument about the 
effect of the CAA amendment on the analysis in Gwaltney was the 
district court in Don't Waste Arizona v. McLane Foods.259 In holding 
that the CAA amendment was clearly designed to circumvent Gwalt-
ney (which held that notice to violators would be superfluous if suits 
alleging only historical violations were allowed to proceed), the court 
in McLane Foods stated: 
This argument [of the United Musical Instruments court] as-
sumes that the language of the EPCRA is identical to the lan-
guage of the pre-1990 Clean Air Act. But Congress did not need 
to amend the language of the EPCRA's citizen suit provision 
because that language already authorized citizen suits for wholly 
past violations.260 
Thus, the court in McLane Foods believed that the failure to amend 
EPCRA at the same time as the CAA indicated that Congress viewed 
EPCRA as already permitting suits for historical violations.261 
While the exact import of EPCRA's notice provision with respect 
to suits for historical violations remains undetermined, the only Su-
preme Court decision to deal with notice provisions generally, Hall-
strom, endures as persuasive authority having spelled out the func-
tions of a notice provision.262 Similarly, the impact of subsequent 
environmental legislation on EPCRA remains unresolved by the 
courts. 
255 See id. 
256 See id. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. 
259 See Don't Waste Ariz. v. McLane Foods, 950 F. Supp. 972, 976 (D. Ariz. 1997). 
260 [d. 
261 See id. 
262 See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing Hallstrom). 
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E. The Role of Citizen Suits Vis-a-V'/.S EPA Enforcement Authority 
In framing EPCRA, Congress envisioned a two-pronged enforce-
ment mechanism, with the EPA given primary responsibility for en-
forcing the statute but with citizens also permitted to sue violators of 
the statute.263 Within the context of citizen suits for purely historical 
violations, the courts have posited structural arguments about the 
proper role of citizen suits in light of the EPA's broader enforcement 
authority. 
In United Musical Instruments, the Sixth Circuit addressed this 
structural issue, arguing that the supplementary role of citizen suits 
as envisioned by Congress precluded suits for historical violations.264 
First, the United Musical Instruments court stated that the differ-
ent, broader authority granted to the EPA under section l1045(c)(4) 
"indicates a congressional intent to limit citizen suits to ongoing vio-
lations and to give the EPA sole authority to seek penalties for his-
torical violations.''266 Specifically, the court considered it significant 
that the EPA was empowered to seek a broad range of criminal, civil, 
and administrative penalties.266 Second, the court drew on the reason-
ing in Gwaltney, stating that an "anomaly" would develop if citizen 
suits were allowed to proceed on the basis of historical violations.267 
The ban on citizen suits once an agency action was underway bespoke 
a congressional intent that ''the citizen suit is meant to supplement 
rather than to supplant government action.''268 Allowing citizen suits 
alleging only historical violations to continue would "undermine the 
supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit."269 Finally, the 
court noted that the EPA's "dealmaking" power could be compro-
mised by an over-broad reading of the citizen suit provision.270 The 
EPA might deem it appropriate in certain cases to forego penalties in 
return for some concession of the violator.271 Violators would have 
263 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (1994). 
2&1 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
265 Id. 
286 See id. 
267 See id. at 476. 
288 See id. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,484 U.S. 49, 
60 (1987». 
269 See United Musical InstrumentB, 61 F.3d at 476 (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60). 
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
1999] RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT 419 
little incentive to strike a bargain with the EPA if they could face civil 
penalties years later in a citizen suit.272 
The court in McLean Foods addressed this argument, arriving at a 
different conclusion.273 Responding to the defendant's contention that 
allowing citizen suits for historical violations would supplant rather 
than supplement the EPA's role, the court noted the limited resources 
of the EPA and indicated that the proper role for the citizen suit is to 
permit the citizen to take action where administrative considerations 
do not permit the EPA to do SO.274 The court reasoned that it was 
impossible for the kind of "duplicative" enforcement hypothesized by 
the courts in Gwaltney and United Musical Instruments to occur, 
because citizen suits are barred as soon as the EPA begins pursuing 
administrative or civil actions against an alleged violator.276 However, 
the court did not address the precise situation about which those 
courts speculated: when the EPA made an administrative decision not 
to pursue an action in exchange for some other concession.276 The 
EPA's priority in pursuing a violator to the exclusion of citizen suits 
only arises if the Administrator is pursuing a civil or administrative 
action, not if the EPA makes some alternate kind of arrangement.277 
F. Legislative History 
As is typical in the case of an ambiguous statutory provision, the 
courts have looked to the legislative history of the statute for guid-
ance in interpreting EPCRA's citizen suit provision.278 The courts 
have noted Congress' emphasis on promptly filing the reports re-
quired by EPCRA in order to enable communities to adequately for-
mulate emergency response plans.279 However, determining the best 
manner in which to address the failure to comply with EPCRA's 
deadlines-through citizen suits or EPA action-has divided the 
COurtS.280 
2'12 See id.; see also Gwaltney, 484 u.s. at 61 (stating that allowing citizen suits years later for 
the same violation would "curtai1[] considerably" the exercise of the EPA's discretion and 
thereby "change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive."). 
273 950 F. Supp. 972, 978 (D. Ariz. 1997). 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
276 See id. 
m Seeid. 
278 See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg., Corp., 772 F. 
Supp. 745, 750-51 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
279 See, e.g., Williams v. Leybold Techs., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 765, 768 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
280 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1996); Atlantic 
States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 476 (6th. Cir. 1995). 
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In Whiting, the district court considered the congressional Confer-
ence Report related to the passage of EPCRA.281 The court quoted 
one passage in particular: 
[The filing of EPCRA reports such as the MSDS] is obviously a 
critical first step to achieving the intent of EPCRA, for without 
the filing of this information, state and local officials have no way 
of receiving the necessary information regarding hazardous chem-
icals to make available to the public and to formulate an effective 
emergency response plan.282 
The emphasis placed on obtaining full and accurate information on a 
timely basis, in the interests of public safety, persuaded the court that 
to overlook EPCRA's reporting deadlines in the context of citizen 
suits by disallowing suits for historical violations would "subvert the 
objectives of EPCRA."283 The inability of SERCs and LEPCs to form 
emergency response plans because of overdue or unavailable informa-
tion would clearly frustrate the intent of Congress in passing the 
statute.284 
The court in United Musical Instruments acknowledged the impor-
tance Congress attached to such information being made available 
both to the public and to the necessary authorities.286 Nonetheless, the 
court noted that once the forms are filed, this congressional goal is 
achieved and a citizen suit is rendered unnecessary.286 Nothing in the 
legislative history, according to the court, indicated that Congress 
intended to allow citizens to sue in the case of purely historical viola-
tions.287 
Despite these attempts to glean from EPCRA's legislative history 
some guidance on the citizen suit provision, the fact remains that in 
no part of its history does Congress specifically address whether 
EPCRA intended to allow citizen suits for historical violations. The 
murky and ambiguous legislative history has led a majority of courts 
to sidestep this analysis altogether, and attempt instead to focus on 
the language of the statute.288 
281 See 772 F. Supp. at 750. 
282 Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962 at 309-10 (1986». 
283 See id. at 751. 
284 See id. For a similar analysis and conclusion, see Leybold TheM. Inc., 784 F. Supp. at 768. 
286 61 F.3d at 477. 
286 See id. 
287 See id. 
288 See 8Upra notes 189-225 and accompanying text. 
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G. Policy Arguments 
The courts have also turned to policy arguments to bolster their 
readings of EPCRA's citizen suit provision. The court in United Mu-
sical Instruments was most concerned about the preemption of the 
EPA's enforcement authority by citizen suits.289 Also, in that court's 
view, once the required forms were filed, a citizen suit was unneces-
sary because the congressional goal of providing information was 
satisfied.290 The court seemed to conclude that a broad reading of the 
citizen suit provision was unwise given the structure of the statute, 
which granted greater enforcement authority to the EPA and envi-
sioned only a supplementary role for citizen enforcement.291 
The Seventh Circuit, and district courts following its reasoning, 
adopted a broader reading of the citizen suit provision to encompass 
purely historical violations because those courts believed that Con-
gress' remedial purpose was best effectuated by allowing such suits.2m 
First, the Citizens court noted EPCRA's relatively light burden on 
industry, requiring only reporting and filing forms, not substantive 
reductions in the amount of chemicals released.293 The Citizens court 
noted that most of the information requiring disclosure under EP-
CRA must be compiled for other purposes, and asserted that the costs 
associated with compliance are low.294 Neither the statute itself nor 
the EPA's regulations mandate a particular methodology for collecting 
the information required for the reports.295 Section 1l023(g)(2), for 
example, states: "[n]othing in this section requires the monitoring or 
measurement of the quantities, concentration, or frequency of any 
toxic chemical released into the environment beyond that monitoring 
and measuring required under other provisions of law or regula-
tion.''296 The court also cited annual cost figures for compliance with 
this section: $326 in fixed costs, and from $43.50 to $146.81 in variable 
costS.297 A violator's failure to comply with a statute imposing so few 
burdens and such light costs seemed to persuade the court that allow-
289 S66 generally 61 F.3d at 473. 
290 S66 id. at 477. 
291 S66 id. 
e S6e, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1997). 
200 See id. at 1239. 
21M See id. 
296 See id. 
296 42 U.S.C. § 1l023(g)(2) (referring to toxic release infonnation contained in Fonn Rs). 
2117 See Citizen8, 90 F.3d at 1240. 
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ing citizen suits for even historical violations was permissible to en-
sure compliance.298 • 
In addition to relatively light reporting costs, the court in Citizens 
saw another reason for permitting suits for historical violations. The 
court viewed EPCRA as creating a "structure that encourages pri-
vate citizens to invest the resources necessary to uncover violations 
of the Act by allowing courts to award the costs of enforcement to 
prevailing or substantially prevailing parties."299 If citizen suits are 
not allowed to proceed once the violator has cured the violation by 
submitting the required forms, the court saw no incentive for citizens 
to invest those resources.300 As the court stated, "[p]ut simply, if 
citizens can't sue, they can't recover the costs of their efforts."301 The 
result of not permitting suits for past violations would be that private 
enforcement of the reporting requirements would decline.302 The citi-
zen suit provision would be rendered, according to the court, "virtu-
ally meaningless."303 
IV. STEEL Co. V. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 
With the judicial landscape characterized by confusion over the 
proper interpretation of the citizen suit provision, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Citizens case.304 In determin-
ing whether EPCRA's citizen suit permitted suits for purely historical 
violations, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had split over virtually 
every issue: the meaning of the statutory language, the effect of the 
notice provision, the role of the citizen suit in light of the EPA's 
enforcement authority, the import of the legislative history, the effect 
of Gwaltney and Hallstrom, and the dominant policy objectives.306 The 
only issue every district and appeals court implicitly agreed upon was 
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for historical violations.306 How-
ever, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Supreme 
298 See id. 
299 [d. at 1244. 
300 See id. 
301 [d. 
302 See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1245. 
303 See id. at 1244. 
111M 117 S. Ct. 1079,1079 (1997). 
306 See generally Citizens, 90 F.3d 1237; Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical 
Instruments, 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995). 
306 See generally notes 190-304 supra and accompanying text (discussing the federal courts' 
various approaches to the historical violations issue). 
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Court seized on the issue of standing and held that the plaintiff in fact 
had not met the Article III requirements.307 The Court ordered the 
judgment vacated and the case dismissed because the lack of standing 
meant the federal courts were deprived of jurisdiction to entertain 
the case.3OB 
In an opinion penned by Justice Scalia,309 the Court devoted a ma-
jority of its discussion to explaining why an adjudication on the merits 
was inappropriate when the Article III standing requirements were 
not met.310 Specifically, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens' 
concurrence, which argued that the question whether section l1046(a) 
permitted citizen suits for historical violations was also "jurisdic-
tional," and thus had an equivalent claim to being resolved first.3ll The 
majority regarded this argument as an "attempt to convert the merits 
issue in this case into a jurisdictional one."3l2 The Court, according to 
the majority, was not permitted to proceed to the merits of the case 
without ascertaining whether the plaintiff had standing.3l3 Assuming 
"hypothetical jurisdiction" in order to proceed to the merits of the 
case would carry the Court "beyond the bounds of authorized judicial 
action and thus offend fundamental principles of separation of pow-
ers."3l4 
Turning to the standing question, the Court first reviewed the three 
requirements: injury, causation, and redressability.3l5 This triad, ac-
cording .to the Court, "comprises the core of Article Ill's case-or-con-
troversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction 
bears the burden of establishing its existence."3l6 The Court refused 
to decide whether being deprived of the information requiring disclo-
sure under EPCRA was a cognizable injury in fact.317 However, even 
3lY1118 S. Ct. 1003, 1020 (1998). 
S08 See id. 
309 Justice Scalia also authored the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife decision, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), 
and has greatly influenced the Court's interpretation of the doctrine of standing. In Lujan, the 
Court held that the plaintiff organization lacked standing to sue under the citizen suit provision 
of the Endangered Species Act because the Court found no cognizable injury. See id.; see also 
Scalia, supra note 227, at 881. 
310 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009-16. 
311 See id. at 1009. 
312 Id. at 1012. 
313 See id. 
314 Id. at 1012, 1015. The Court's standing discussion is not entirely germane to this Comment 
so only the key points are highlighted. 
316 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1016-17. 
316 Id. at 1017. 
317 See id. at 1018. 
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assuming that the plaintiff could show injury, the Court held that the 
plaintiff had failed to satisfy the third requirement of standing, re-
dressability.318 The Court listed each of the remedies sought in the 
complaint, and tested whether those remedies would redress the kind 
of injuries alleged by the plaintiff.319 The plaintiff requested the fol-
lowing remedies: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendant vio-
lated EPCRA; (2) authorization to periodically inspect defendant's 
facility and records (with costs borne by the defendant); (3) an order 
requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiff with copies of all 
compliance reports submitted by the EPA; (4) an order requiring the 
defendant to pay civil penalties; (5) reasonable witness and attorney's 
fees; and (6) any other relief the court deemed appropriate.320 
The Court addressed the declaratory judgment remedy first.321 
Considering that the defendant had admitted that it had failed to file 
the reports in a timely fashion and recognized this was a violation of 
EPCRA, the Court found this to be "not only worthless to the plain-
tiff, [but also] seemingly worthless to all the world."322 The Court also 
summarily dismissed the argument that the remedies allowing the 
plaintiff to inspect the defendant's records and to receive copies of 
reports filed with the EPA would remedy the plaintiff's injury.323 The 
Court categorized these remedies as injunctive (and therefore pro-
spective) in nature, because they were aimed at preventing future 
wrongs, not remedying past violations.324 
The Court noted that civil penalties, on the other hand, were gen-
erally appropriate to remedy an injury to a plaintiff.326 However, while 
awarding monetary damages to the plaintiff would normally remedy 
a past wrong, EPCRA damages are payable to the Treasury Depart-
ment, not to the individual plaintiff.326 In requesting monetary dam-
ages under EPCRA, the plaintiff is serving an "undifferentiated pub-
lic interest," not attempting to receive compensation for the wrong 
committed against him.327 Further, any "psychic satisfaction" received 
318 See id. 
819 See id. 
320 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018. 
321 See id. 
322 [d. 
323 See id. at 1019. 
324 See id. 
325 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018. 
326 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c). 
327 Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992». 
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by the plaintiff in seeing the defendant punished did not rise to the 
level of satisfying the redressability prong.328 
In addressing the attorney's fees and costs remedy, the Court noted 
that a plaintiff may not "achieve standing to litigate a substantive 
issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The litigation must 
give the plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs 
that are a byproduct of the litigation itself."329 The plaintiff had also 
argued that it was entitled to an award for the costs associated with 
investigating the alleged violation.330 The Seventh Circuit had held 
that permitting citizen suits for historical violations was necessary so 
that plaintiffs could recover their costs and be encouraged to sue.331 
In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the statute itself only 
permitted monetary relief for "costs of litigation," not investigatory 
costS.332 The Court noted that "for the expenses to be reimbursable 
under the statute, they must be costs of litigation; but reimbursement 
of the costs of litigation alone cannot support standing."333 
Not finding that any of the plaintiff's potential injuries could be 
redressed by the requested relief, the Court ordered the case dis-
missed.334 While the judgment of the Court was unanimous, the part 
of the Court's opinion addressing the plaintiff's standing was joined 
by six justices.335 The remaining three members of the Court, though 
concurring in the judgment that the case should be dismissed, did not 
join the Court's opinion because they viewed passing on the undecided 
constitutional standing question as unnecessary to the resolution of 
the case.336 
328 See id. 
329 [d. at 1019. 
330 See id. 
331 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). 
332 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1019; Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Whiting, 1994 WL 236473 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that investigatory work conducted prior to the plaintiff's ''notice of 
intent to sue" being sent to the defendant is not compensable under EPCRA); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11046(t). 
333 Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1019; see also Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. 
334 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020. 
335 See generally id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Breyer joined Justice Scalia's opinion. 
336 See id. at 1021 (Stevens, J., concurring). The discussion regarding Justice Stevens' views 
on why the standing question need not be addressed first are not germane to this Comment and 
therefore will not be recited here. See id. at 1021-27 (discussing justification for avoiding the 
constitutional issue and ruling on the statutory construction issue). His opinion was joined in 
part by Justices Souter and Ginsberg. See id. at 1021. 
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According to Justice Stevens, the determination of whether EP-
CRA permitted citizen suits for purely historical violations was, like 
the standing issue, also a jurisdictional question.337 He evaluated 
whether the statute granted the federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
suits alleging only historical violations.338 While Justice Stevens ex-
pressed a preference for first determining this aspect of the jurisdic-
tional question, he did address the standing issue before turning to 
what he saw as the other, nonconstitutional, jurisdictional question.339 
Justice Stevens began by citing the cases in which the Court denied 
standing for lack of redressability, noting they all shared a common 
feature: the plaintiff was challenging the government's action or inac-
tion.340 In none of these cases had the Court denied standing to a 
private plaintiff suing a private defendant to impose a statutory sanc-
tion.341 Justice Stevens saw a danger in denying standing to a plaintiff 
who has alleged a legitimate injury on the basis of redressability 
alone.342 According to the majority opinion, if Congress had authorized 
a payment directly to the plaintiff, rather than to the Treasury De-
partment, the plaintiff would have had standing.343 InJustice Stevens' 
view, allowing the standing question to turn on whether the plaintiff 
received compensation was an artificial distinction.344 
Justice Stevens, in evaluating the assertion that EPCRA itself did 
not permit suits for historical violations, relied on the Gwaltney case 
and the United Musical Instruments line of reasoning.345 Noting the 
ambiguity in the language of EPCRA's citizen suit provision, Justice 
Stevens found two justifications for refusing to allow citizen suits for 
purely historical violations.346 First, he determined that the notice 
provision of EPCRA should be construed as evidence of congressional 
intent to limit citizen suits to ongoing and future violations, as the 
Court had found in Gwaltney.347 Second, Justice Stevens viewed per-
337 See id. at 1022. 
838 See id. 
339 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1027. 
940 See id. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. at 1028. 
343 See id. at 1018, 1028. 
344 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1030. Justice Stevens apparently subscribed to a broader view 
of redressability, stating that the requirement would be satisfied if the plaintiff regarded the 
remedy as redressing his injury. See id. 
345 See id. at 1031-32. 
346 See id. at 1031. 
347 See id. 
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mitting suits for historical violations as supplanting, rather than sup-
plementing, the EPA's role.348 Given Congress' allocation of broader 
enforcement powers to the EPA, allowing citizen suits in this situation 
would complicate and interfere with the statutory structure estab-
lished by Congress.349 Justice Stevens also cited a possible third justi-
fication for his conclusion: this interpretation avoided an unnecessary 
adjudication of the constitutional standing issue.350 Thus, the concur-
rence also would recommend that the case be dismissed, for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction over suits alleging purely historical viola-
tions.361 
V. ANALYSIS 
In the wake of Steel Co., several questions linger. The Steel Co. 
majority left unanswered the question of whether EPCRA's citizen 
suit provision encompassed suits for purely historical violations.362 
However, the Court's ruling on the standing issue indicates that such 
suits will not be constitutionally permitted absent some means of 
redressing the historical injury.363 
While criticizing the Court's reasoning in Steel Co., this Section 
argues that the result-permitting EPCRA citizen suits only for 
current or ongoing violations-is correct. 
A. Effect of Steel Co. 
The Court in Steel Co. avoided the statutory question and deter-
mined that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue based on its failure to 
demonstrate redressability.364 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
held that injunctive relief, an award of costs, and the payment of civil 
penalties to the Treasury Department were insufficient to meet the 
redressability test.356 As a result, Congress would need to provide 
some other means of remedying the injury to EPCRA plaintiffs in 
order to satisfy the Court's stringent redressability standard. How-
ever, even this may not be sufficient to render a suit for historical 
848 See ill. 
1149 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1031. 
IIIiO See ill. at 1032. 
361 See ill. 
362 See generally ill. at 1003. 
363 See ill. at 1018. 
364 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018. 
36fi See ill. at 1018-19. 
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violations constitutional. The Court did not evaluate whether, in the 
words of one commentator, "the informational injury to the plaintiffs 
would satisfy the constitutional standing requirement for a particu-
larized injury."356 The Court upon future review of EPCRA might 
deem the injury alleged as not sufficiently distinct and particularized 
to meet constitutional standing requirements.357 
Thus, one practical effect of the Steel Co. case is that Congress may 
be unable to constitutionally authorize citizen suits for purely histori-
cal violations (for any environmental statute) in light of the standing 
problem.358 Because of the potential for a broader application of the 
Steel Co. case in other environmental law contexts and due to the 
danger inherent in utilizing the standing doctrine to defeat disfavored 
legislation,359 the Steel Co. case seems to have arrived at the correct 
conclusion360 while pursuing a faulty line of reasoning. A better justi-
fication for the result was articulated in Justice Stevens' concurrence, 
which stated that EPCRA itself does not permit citizen suits.361 To 
Justice Stevens, it seemed illogical to deny standing merely because 
the remedy authorized by Congress was payable to the Treasury and 
not to the plaintiff.362 
B. Statutory Analysis 
Regardless of the practical effect of the Steel Co. case, the Court 
ostensibly refused to pass on the issue of whether EPCRA's plain 
language either directly or implicitly allows citizen suits for purely 
historical violations.363 For several reasons, this Comment maintains 
that the statute does not and should not permit such suits. 
Numerous courts have attempted to divine clarity from an admit-
tedly ambiguous statutory provision.364 The citizen suit provision of 
EPCRA empowers citizens with the ability to sue owners or opera-
356 See William Funk, Supreme Court News, 23 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, *4 (Summer 1998). 
367 See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
368 See Funk, supra note 356, at *5 (discussing the ''unrelenting hostility of the Court to citizen 
suits as an adjunct or supplement to government enforcement, a hostility that was expressed 
in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lujan"). 
369 See id. 
360 See infra notes 365--96 and accompanying text Gustifying the prohibition on citizen suits 
alleging only historical violations). 
361 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1031-32. 
362 See id. at 1028-29. 
363 See id. at 1020. 
364 See supra notes 190-226 and accompanying text (discussing the attempts by the federal 
courts to interpret the language of EPCRA's citizen suit). 
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tors of facilities covered by the statute who fail to complete and 
submit the required forms.365 The provision goes on to reference the 
sections which describe the forms required and establish deadlines for 
the submission of such forms.366 Courts such as the Seventh Circuit in 
Citizens have construed this latter language-requiring forms "un-
der" other referenced sections of the Act-as incorporating the filing 
deadlines into the citizen suit provision.367 
A better reading of the provision would treat the referenced sec-
tions as merely identifying and clarifying which forms must be com-
pleted and filed to avoid a citizen suit. For example, section 
l1046(a)(1)(A)(iv) permits citizens to sue owners or operators of fa-
cilities who fail to complete and submit a chemical release form "under 
section l1023(a) of this title."366 The "under" language merely am-
plifies and defines what is meant by a "chemical release form" and 
does not impose any additional elements. Further, the "failure to do" 
language implies a lack of completion and indicates that once the 
forms are in fact filed, the violator no longer can be said to have 
"failed" to do something.369 It should be noted, however, that the 
completion of the forms only insulates the violator from further citizen 
suit liability, not from investigation by the EPA.370 Moreover, this 
reading avoids placing additional potential liability with respect to 
citizen suits on owners and operators in the absence of a reasonably 
clear congressional mandate. 
Second, the Supreme Court's decisions in Gwaltney and Hallstrom 
construing the function of the notice provision remain good law.371 In 
Hallstrom, the Court held that the purpose behind requiring notice 
to alleged violators was to give them the opportunity to cure the 
violation prior to suit, thereby rendering the citizen suit unneces-
sary.372 Subsequent decisions, including Citizens, have argued that 
Congress' post-Gwaltney amendment to the Clean Air Act permitting 
citizen suits for purely historical violations while leaving the notice 
provision intact fatally undermines the analysis of those cases.373 
3(;6 See 42 u.s.c. § 11046. 
366 See id. 
367 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1997). 
368 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(I)(A)(iv). 
369 See id. § 11046(a)(I). 
370 See id. § 11045. 
371 See supra notes 168-89 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney and Hallstrom). 
372 See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text (discussing Hallstrom). 
373 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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Two arguments caution against this conclusion. First, Congress 
cannot overrule the Supreme Court's decision regarding one environ-
mental statute, the Clean Water Act, by amending another, the Clean 
Air Act. Second, a subsequent act of Congress (whether or not moti-
vated by the Gwaltney decision) can be construed in different ways, 
not necessarily in favor of the conclusion that the Supreme Court's 
reasoning regarding the notice provision was wrong. The result in 
Gwaltney may have led Congress to clarify what it originally intended 
in framing the suit provision, i.e., to permit suits for purely historical 
violations.374 However, an equally plausible reason for the change is 
that the Supreme Court was correct in its analysis but that Congress 
in fact changed its collective mind. Also, the failure to amend EPCRA 
(or the CWA) at the same time as it amended the CAA could mean 
that the Court's interpretation was correct with respect to EPCRA 
and the CWA but wrong with respect to the CAA. Attempting to 
disregard binding Supreme Court precedent on the basis of an amend-
ment to one law and the failure to change another does not represent 
sound statutory analysis. The Court's reading of the notice provision 
as affording the opportunity for the violator to cure remains a reason-
able interpretation of the function of the provision, whatever other 
functions the courts may hypothesize the provision serves.376 
Apart from the statutory language and the notice provision, a third 
structural argument militates against allowing citizen suits for his-
torical violations. The courts in United Musical Instruments and 
Gwaltney both emphasized the supplementary role of citizen enforce-
ment, with primary enforcement authority vested in the EPA.376 Both 
Gwaltney and United Musical Instruments were concerned about the 
possibility of the EPA's dealmaking powers being compromised by a 
citizen suit.377 The court in McLean Foods did not appear concerned 
about the possible dilution of EPA authority, believing that the ban 
on citizen suits once the EPA pursues an investigation eliminates the 
possibility of duplicative enforcement.378 
Nonetheless, the fears of the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit, 
regarding the threat to EPA power by citizen suits alleging only 
historical violations, materialized in Neighbors for a Toxic Free Com-
374 See id. 
375 See Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20 (1989). 
376 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987); 
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 1995). 
377 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60; United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 476. 
378 See Don't Waste Ariz. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972, 978 (D. Ariz. 1997). 
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munity v. Vulcan Materials CO.379 In that case, a quantity of toxic 
chemicals, including hydrochloric acid, was released from a tank car 
leased by the defendant, Vulcan, and the spill required the evacuation 
of some 200 residents from the surrounding area.3BO The EPA later 
served an administrative complaint alleging violations of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act381 
(CERCLA) stemming from Vulcan's failure to report the spill for over 
four hours after it was discovered.382 The EPA later entered into a 
consent agreement with Vulcan, which "serve[d] as a full and fair 
settlement of all issues, claims and allegations relating to [Vulcan's] 
reporting requirements in connection with the release of hydrochloric 
acid raised in the complaint."383 Notwithstanding the consent agree-
ment, the plaintiff organization filed suit against Vulcan, alleging a 
violation of EPCRA for the failure to submit a follow-up emergency 
notice as required by the statute.384 When Vulcan moved to dismiss 
the action because of the preclusive effect of the consent agreement, 
the court ruled that the EPA had acted under the auspices of CER-
CLA, not EPCRA, and thus the allegation regarding the EPCRA 
violation was not precluded.385 
The danger inherent in this decision stems from the fact that the 
plaintiff was permitted to continue in a suit for a purely historical 
violation, after the EPA sought to resolve the entire incident giving 
rise to the suit through a consent agreement. The EPA could have 
avoided this result by including the EPCRA violation in the consent 
agreement. However, environmental legislation is characterized by 
overlapping provisions in many cases (such as the situation occurring 
in the Vulcan case with respect to separate EPCRA and CERCLA 
violations), making it difficult for the EPA to mention every conceiv-
able violation under every statute in a consent agreement. Further, 
it was apparent in the Vulcan case that the EPA attempted to settle 
all claims relating to the underlying incident.386 In the future, violators 
may be unwilling to settle with the EPA because they cannot be 
guaranteed that the consent agreement will bar future citizen suits. 
379 See 964 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1997). 
380 See id. at 1449. 
381 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603, 9609. 
382 See Vulcan, 964 F. Supp. at 1449. 
383 [d. 
384 See id. 
385 See id. at 1450. 
386 See id. (discussing the language of the settlement agreement). 
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This result easily can be avoided by refusing to allow citizen suits for 
purely historical violations. 
C. Policy Arguments 
The Sixth Circuit determined that public policy considerations fa-
vored a supplementary role for citizen suits and the preservation of 
the EPA's broad authority.387 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, 
determined that the relatively light burden of EPCRA reporting 
requirements weighed in favor of allowing suits for purely historical 
violations.388 Also, the Seventh Circuit was worried that disallowing 
such suits would cripple the citizen suit provision because citizens 
would be discouraged from investing time, money, and effort if there 
was the potential for the case to be dismissed as soon as the violator 
came into compliance with the statute.389 
The Steel Co. case, however, does not preclude citizen suits for 
ongoing or current violations. Nonetheless, Professor William Funk 
of Lewis and Clark Law School has argued: "[A]ny [EPCRA] defen-
dant receiving a 60-day notice letter could file the necessary reports 
before the complaint was filed and avoid suit on the strength of this 
case. This would effectively eviscerate the EPCRA citizen suit provi-
sion."390 This view seems to coincide with the predictions of some 
commentators prior to the Steel Co. case.391 Despite the continued 
viability of the citizen suit provision for present violations, these 
commentators anticipate the speedy demise of EPCRA. 
This forecasting completely ignores the function of EPCRA. The 
entire purpose of the statute is to provide citizens with information 
concerning the chemicals being used or stored in their neighborhoods 
and communities. The fact that a facility can avoid a suit entirely by 
merely filing the requisite forms spares the citizen the cost of litigat-
ing, prompts early compliance by the facility, and achieves the precise 
result EPCRA intended. The facility does not "escape" the mandates 
387 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
388 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1239 (7th Cir. 1996). 
389 See id. at 1244. 
390 See Funk, supra note 356, at *5. 
391 See Lohmann, supra note 205, at 1748 (stating that permitting suits for historical violations 
is necessary to "teach the [corporate and industrial] Goliaths that they cannot escape [EP-
CRA],,); see also Vahey, supra note 205, at 270-71 (arguing that citizens must be allowed to 
pursue suits alleging only historical violations to safeguard the public's right of "supplemental 
enforcement" of EPCRA). 
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of the statute by filing the forms prior to the commencement of the 
suit. While it can be argued that the prohibition on suits for historical 
violations encourages companies to avoid the law until a citizen files 
suit, this ignores the role of the EPA. The EPA can always punish 
such an intentional violator (by fines and criminal penalties), even if 
the violator cannot be sued by citizens. Moreover, a citizen or envi-
ronmental group denied the opportunity to pursue a suit because the 
violation has been cured can always notify the EPA and request that 
it proceed against the violator. 
Thus, the structure and function of EPCRA justify the prohibition 
of citizen suits for wholly historical violations. First, it bears repeating 
that a violator who files the necessary reports prior to the commence-
ment of a suit is not completely insulated from liability. The EPA can 
always choose to pursue violators for past and present violations, and 
can act to deter future violations. Second, prohibiting citizen suits for 
historical violations does not preclude suits alleging a high likelihood 
of the offense recurring from proceeding, even if the owner or opera-
tor has since complied with the statute. Third, EPCRA is by nature 
a statute which requires cooperation from industry to function prop-
erly. None of the reporting requirements mandate a particular meth-
odology for collecting the necessary information. Consequently, the 
threat of citizen suits for past violations, instead of encouraging in-
dustry compliance, may provoke industry to release inaccurate or 
incomplete information merely to comply with the deadlines. Finally, 
EPCRA is unlike other environmental statutes because its purpose 
consists of promoting the public's right to know.392 EPCRA is infor-
mational in nature, not truly regulatory.393 It does not penalize facili-
ties for the levels of toxic chemicals stored or disposed of on the 
premises.394 It merely requires the disclosure of such information to 
the public for planning purposes.396 This function is inconsistent with 
exposing facilities to the threat of citizen suits once the public interest 
is satisfied by the violator filing the required forms. 
3W See generally notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text (discussing informational and 
planning functions of EPCRA). ' 
393 See id. 
31M See id. 
896 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the practical effect of the Steel Co. case remains to be seen, 
the case does indicate that constitutional standing requirements 
would not permit citizen suits for purely historical violations, due to 
an inability to demonstrate redressability. Congress could alleviate 
the redressability problem by providing for monetary damages to 
plaintiffs; the statutory interpretation problem could be remedied by 
an amendment specifically authorizing suits for historical violations. 
However, the structure and function of EPCRA, with its reliance on 
voluntary compliance and its uniquely informational nature, militates 
against such a change by Congress. 
